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Tyler Burge notably offers a truth-first account of per-
ceptual entitlement in terms of a priori necessary repre-
sentational functions and norms: on his account, epis-
temic normativity turns on natural norms, which turn
on representational functions. This paper has two aims:
first, it criticises Tyler Burge’s truth-first a priori deriva-
tion on functionalist and value-theoretic grounds. Sec-
ond, it develops a novel, knowledge-first a priori deriva-
tion of perceptual entitlement. According to the view
developed here, it is a priori that we are entitled to
believe the deliverances of our perceptual belief forma-
tion system, in virtue of the latter’s constitutive function
of generating knowledge.
1 INTRODUCTION
Tyler Burge1 once famously argued that perceptual epistemic entitlement can be derived on a
priori grounds (2013). The claim, scandalous and exceptionally thoroughly defended, got a lot
of attention and made a very nice career for itself. At the same time, it’s fair to say, not many
philosophers rushed to embrace it. Burge himself gave up some of its initial ambition as of late
(e.g. 2003, 2020).
This paper attempts a novel a priori derivation of perceptual epistemic entitlement. Like
Burge’s, it does so on functionalist grounds: it proceeds from the representational function of
our perceptual capacities. Contra Burge, it argues that the function at stake is generating knowl-
edge, and that this function gives rise to a constitutive epistemic norm of belief which, when met,
delivers epistemic entitlement.
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To this aim, I first (Section #2) unpack Burge’s argument in its most recent form, and argue
that it fails at two junctures: first, we miss support for Burge’s claim that a norm of reliability
in function fulfilment—which is supposed to ground epistemic entitlement—drops out of the
function in question (Section #3). Second, we don’t have support for the function of our belief
formation capacities being to generatemere true beliefs (Section #4). Last (Section #5), I propose
my own derivation that, in avoiding the second juncture by making a knowledge function claim,
does not require the reliability claim downstream either. In the last section I conclude.
2 BURGE’S DERIVATION
Tyler Burge (e.g. 2003, 2010, 2013, 2020) gives a truth-centric account of perceptual entitlement
in terms of a priori necessary, representational functions and norms: on his account, epistemic
normativity turns on natural norms, which turn on representational functions.
Burge takes it to be a priori that if a system is a representational system, it has a representational
function. He also takes it that, insofar as a system is a perceptual system, it is a representational
system. In turn, he argues, veridicality is the chief representational good. For propositional rep-
resentations, such as beliefs, the measure of veridicality is truth. According to Burge, every false
belief is a failure qua belief. Since, according to Burge, failure is evidence of function, it follows
that the function of every token belief is to be true (2003, p. 509; 2010; 2020). Attributively (Geach,
1956), then, Burge takes it that good belief is true belief: that is, in order for a belief to be a good
token of its type, in needs to be true. As such, he argues, it is knowable on a priori grounds that
the representational function of systems of belief formation is to generate true beliefs.
According to Burge, wherever there are functions or, more generally, wherever there is purpo-
siveness, there are standards for how to go about realizing the function or the end state of the
purposiveness (2010, p. 339). This applies, he says, “to all biological organisms and their subsys-
tems, to artefacts, to animal agency, to perception and belief, to inference, to knowledge” (2010,
p. 339). The relevant standards are natural norms,2 in that they drop right out of the function in
question.
Importantly, according to Burge, and contra views notably defended by PeterGraham (e.g. 2012)
and RuthMillikan (e.g. 1984), these representational functions and norms do not reduce to biolog-
ical etiological functions. This does not mean that belief-forming structures cannot have forming
true beliefs as a biological etiological function too; it just follows that the latter is a contingent
matter.
According to Burge, entitlement is the fulfilment of norms associated with the representational
good, i.e. truth. As such, epistemic entitlement requires (a) that the belief was formed or sustained
through a competence whose outputs have a very high ratio of true beliefs over false beliefs in
normal, content-fixing3 conditions, and (b) that the belief was well-formed (not throughmalfunc-
tion). In short, warranted beliefs will be beliefs formed via a properly functioning and normally
reliable representational competence.
Here is my reconstruction of Burge’s argument:
1. Representational systems have representational functions.
2. The representational function of a system is to successfully represent.
3. The perceptual belief formation system is a representational system.
4. The representational function of the perceptual belief formation system is to successfully
represent (from 1–3)
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5. Successful representation implies veridicality.
6. The representational function of the perceptual belief formation system is to veridically rep-
resent (from 4 and 5).
7. Veridical propositional representations are true propositional representations.
8. Beliefs are propositional representations.
9. The representational function of the perceptual belief formation system is to form true beliefs
(from 6–8).
10. If a system S has the function of type T to phi, then it (T)-should do so reliably.
11. The perceptual belief formation system constitutively (representationally)-should4 reliably
form true beliefs (from 9 and 10).
Recall, also, that, according to Burge, entitlement is the fulfilment of norms associated with the
representational good, i.e. truth. Epistemic entitlement, then, will be the fulfilment of (11).
The above is an attempted aprioriderivation of Burge’s viewonperceptual entitlement from the
nature of our perceptual systems. Let’s call this the ‘Modest Derivation’ henceforth: it is modest
in that, crucially, it only claims to derive a normative claim: perception should be reliable.
In contrast, earlier Burge stood by an even more ambitious claim: in former work, Burge used
to think that it is a priori that our perceptual systems are reliable in normal, content-determining
conditions, and, as a result, that it is a priori that we are entitled to believe the products of our
perceptual systems (Graham, 2020). Here are some relevant passages from his early work from
the 1990s (collected in 2013) to this effect:
I think that being reliable in normal circumstances can be shown to be necessary to
a capacity [. . . ] to register perceptual appearances [. . . ] (2013: 294) Being a perceiver
necessarily involves certain reliabilities in perceiving normal perceptual objects in
normal circumstances (Burge, 2013, p. 347).
So, to put it differently, while late Burge merely believes the norm (11) follows on a priori
grounds (Modest Derivation), early Burge also believes it follows on a priori grounds that (11) is,
as a matter of fact, met in normal conditions (henceforth, Ambitious Derivation). The Ambitious
Derivation was backed by the following generalized principle about functions:
12. A system S has a function F only if it reliably Fs in normal conditions.
This latter claim, in turn, together with (9), implies:
13. The perceptual belief formation system reliably forms true beliefs in normal conditions.
Unfortunately, (12) is false. Several systems in nature have a function that they only very rarely
fulfil in normal conditions: perhaps the paradigmatic examples are sperm, and danger detection
mechanisms in rabbits (Graham, 2019). Since (12) is false, Burge does not have an a priori deriva-
tion for (13), and we don’t get an a priori entitlement to believe based on perception.
Burge abandoned the Ambitious Derivation in “Perceptual Entitlement” (2003); here is Burge:
“The nature of perceptual states does not require that they be reliably veridical in their nor-
mal content-determining environment [. . . ]—the circumstances in which their contents were
formed.” Importantly though, Burge still stands by the derivation of (11) on a priori grounds.
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In a nutshell: even though it does not follow a priori that perception is reliable in normal condi-
tions, it maywell still follow that it should be, inwhich case Burge is left with an a priori derivation
of his view of perceptual entitlement.
To putmy cards right on the table, inwhat follows, Iwill take issuewith two junctures inBurge’s
Modest Derivation. First, I will argue that (10) is problematic on functionalist grounds. Second, I
will argue that (6) requires further defence.
3 AGAINST THE A PRIORI RELIABILITY NORM
One important problem for Burge is how to account for the fact that many unreliable (in normal
conditions) representational systems can be found in nature. Furthermore, these systems seem,
intuitively, to be properly functioning in spite of their unreliability. Here is Peter Graham (2019):
The rabbit is a skittish creature. At the slightest sign of danger, it runs away. But it
is nearly always running away from nothing. Are its beliefs (suppose it has them)
reliable? In a sense, the rabbit’s danger belief is highly reliable: if danger is present, it
believes danger is present. Harty Field (1990) called this “world-to-head” reliability:
if the world is a certain way, the odds are very high you believe it is that way. Given
what the rabbit needs to produce—a danger belief in the presence of danger—the
rabbit’s beliefs are world-to-head reliable. But the rabbit’s beliefs are not reliable in
the “head-to-world” direction: if it believes theworld is a certainway, it probably isn’t.
It has a dependable but not a ratio-reliable “design.” If truth over error is your goal,
don’t ask a rabbit (Graham, 2019, p. 21).
In short, here is the problem: on Burge’s account, systems that have generating truth as their
function should do so reliably in normal conditions. The case of the rabbit seems to prove other-
wise: indeed, plausibly enough, this is how the rabbit’s representational systems are supposed to
work to begin with: world-to-head reliability keeps the rabbit alive. Head-to-world reliability does
not.
Burge discusses this problem inmany places (e.g. 2003, pp. 517–518, 537). He acknowledges that
reliable representation need not be biologically good representation, nor the other way around.
Even so, he argues that the danger representation in rabbits, should be head-to-world reliable qua
representational kind. The relevant should is the should of representation. That is because, accord-
ing to Burge, given a representational function, the corresponding reliability norm applies: even
if head-to-world reliability would be biologically bad for the rabbit, it would be representationally
good. Being reliable is always a representational norm, given a representational function.
Now, recall that according to Burge, the representational reliability norm drops right out of
the representational function. The thought is that if a trait has the function to generate truths, it
should do so reliably. Recall, also, that Burge takes this principle to be perfectly general. Let’s spell
this out:
FUNCTIONALISTRELIABILITYCLAIM: For any function F of system S, system S shouldF
generate F reliably (where shouldF is a should typed by the function in question, and it is, crucially,
normative, not descriptive).
Why think, in line with Burge, that the FUNCTIONALIST RELIABILITY CLAIM holds? At
first glance, onemight believe it to be quite a simple and plausible idea: if the function of a system
S is to produce apples rather than pears, it’d better be the case that S does so more often than not;
SIMION 315
that is, that more often than not, S successfully produce apples rather than pears. Similarly, if S’s
function is to produce true beliefs rather than false beliefs, it’d better be the case that S does so
more often than not.
Note, though, that this plausible thought is not enough for Burge’s purposes: after all, not just
any reliability rate is enough for epistemic purposes: epistemic normativity requires a very high
level of reliability (50%+1 just won’t do!). If so, the general principle that we actually need ismuch
more stringent: it should be the case that, when something T has the function F in S, T Fs with a
very high degree of reliability:
FUNCTIONALIST RELIABILITY CLAIM*: For any function F of system S, system S
shouldF generate F with a high degree of reliability.
Is FUNCTIONALIST RELIABILITY CLAIM* plausible? For some systems, it seems to hold:
Think of coffeemakers; their function is to produce coffee. If they fail to do so very reliably, they’re
bad coffee makers: they don’t meet the reliability norm for coffee makers.
Note, however, that what is enough, reliability-wise, for norm conformity seems to be domain
specific, and to vary from high thresholds to, indeed, quite low requirements. The example of
the coffee machine is one where high reliability seems required for norm conformity. In other
domains, however, the degree of reliability in reaching the aims internal to the domain required
for norm conformity seems quite low. Consider, for instance, baseball: good players rarely even
reach 30% reliability, but that’s fine. They are not thereby falling short in any way. Similarly, con-
sider, again, sperm: the biological function at stake—reproduction—is extremely unreliably ful-
filled, and that’s biologically perfectly fine: indeed, too much reliability would likely be disastrous
for the species. The FUNCTIONALIST RELIABILITY CLAIM* is false.
One way out for Burge at this point would be to make the claim less ambitious, by restricting
the FUNCTIONALIST RELIABILITY CLAIM* in the following way:
FUNCTIONALIST RELIABILITY CLAIM**: For any function F of system S, system S
shouldF generate F with a D-appropriate degree o reliability (where D stands for the normative
domain at stake).
At least on the face of it, the FUNCTIONALIST RELIABILITY CLAIM** seems correct. The
problem with it, though, is that it fails to serve Burge’s purposes in two ways. Recall that Burge
wanted functions to deliver norms. It is plain to see, though, that the content of the norm out-
lined by the FUNCTIONALIST RELIABILITY CLAIM** is not fully delivered by the function at
stake anymore, but rather it hinges on independent assumptions about the domain in question.
More reliability in function fulfilment is required for some functions than for others, depending
on how the relevant domain D is regulated. Nothing in the description of the function of coffee
machines—making coffees—determines how reliable coffee machines should be: rather, further
details pertaining to the domain of coffee making are what sets the threshold for tolerance for
error: how hard or easy it is to produce a coffee is likely relevant, for instance. Similarly, think of
baseball again: there’s nothing about the function of scoring that delivers the relevant reliability
threshold. Rather, other details about the domain step in: likely, e.g., how hard or easy it is to
produce a base hit.
If that is the case, however, the representational function will not deliver the high reliability
threshold for Burge; rather, further assumptions about the domain are needed in order to set
the reliability norm in place. If this is so, however, we are back to square one: warrant is not
(fully) grounded in our cognitive capacities’ representational functions. Also, if the function does
not fully determine the content of the norm, the claim that the norm in question is an a priori
derivable natural norm remains undefended at two junctures: since it does not solely drop out
of the function at stake, it is not clear the norm in question is a natural norm in Burge’s sense.
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Second, there is reason to think that domain specificity spoils a prioricity. Consider baseball again:
had our species been better at hitting, plausibly, the content of the norm would be different, in
that the domain-specific reliability threshold would be higher. Similarly, one could think that,
had we been better at perceiving (better eyesight, more fine-grained sensory motor skills etc.), the
domain-specific reliability threshold would be higher.
4 AGAINST THE TRUTH FUNCTION
We have seen that Burge’s premise (10), according to which the fact that a system has a particular
function implies there is a norm that requires the system in question to fulfil it reliably fails on
functionalist grounds.While its failure is enough to render the a priori derivation unsuccessful, in
what follows, I would like to point to another, earlier place in the argument where the derivation
breaks down: premise (6). The reason for this is that identifying this particular weakness will be
instructive in developing my own derivation in the section to follow.
For the reader’s convenience, here is my unpacking of Burge’s derivation one more time:
1. Representational systems have representational functions.
2. The representational function of a system is to successfully represent.
3. Our perceptual belief formation system is a representational system.
4. The representational function of our perceptual belief formation system is to successfully rep-
resent (from 1–3)
5. Successful representation implies veridicality.
6. The representational function of our perceptual belief formation system is to veridically rep-
resent (from 4 and 5).
7. Veridical propositional representations are true propositional representations.
8. Beliefs are propositional representations.
9. The representational function of our belief formation system is to form true beliefs (from 6–8).
10. If a system S has the function of type T to phi, then it (T)-should do so reliably.
11. Our belief formation system constitutively (representationally)-should reliably form true
beliefs. (from 9 and 10).
Note that (6)—the truth function claim—is supposed to follow from the conjunction of two
claims: The claim that the representational function of our perceptual belief formation system is
to successfully represent, and the claim that successful representation implies veridicality. Note,
though, that the latter claim is a mere necessity claim: veridicality is necessary for successful
representation.However, (6) takes veridicality to be the function of our perceptual belief formation
system; it takes it, then, to be the success condition for function fulfilment.Whatwould be needed,
however, in support of this claimwould be a stronger claim than (5), one that stipulates necessary
and sufficient conditions for successful representation rather than just necessary conditions. (6)
is too strong: what (5) lends support to, in conjunction with (4), is the weaker:
(6)’ The representational function X of our perceptual belief formation implies veridi-
cal representation (from 4 and 5).
Veridicallity is necessary for successful representation, therefore, since the function of percep-
tion is to successfully represent, it follows that the function of perception, whatever it may be,
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implies veridicality. (6)’ is, of course, compatible with the function of perception being to gener-
ate beliefs that are true and that, on top of this, also feature a bunch of other properties. For all
the derivation shows, then, it may well be that the function of our perceptual mechanisms is, e.g.,
to generate pleasant true beliefs.
In turn, if we replace (6) with (6)’, the argument for Burge’s favourite truth-first reliabilist view
of perceptual entitlement also breaks down (independently of the failure of (10)).
1. Representational systems have representational functions.
2. The representational function of a system is to successfully represent.
3. Our perceptual belief formation system is a representational system.
4. The representational function of our perceptual belief formation system is to successfully rep-
resent (from 1–3)
5. Successful representation implies veridicality.
6. (6)’ The representational function of our perceptual belief formation implies veridical repre-
sentation (from 4 and 5).
7. Veridical propositional representations are true propositional representations.
8. Beliefs are propositional representations.
9. (9)’ The representational function of our belief formation system is formation of beliefs with
property X, where X implies truth (from 6–8).
10. If a system S has the function of type T to phi, then it (T)-should do so reliably.
11. (11)’ Our belief formation system constitutively (representationally)-should reliably form
beliefs with property X that implies truth (from 9 and 10).
The argument for Burge’s preferred view of perceptual entitlement breaks down: for validity,
(9) needs to be replaced by (9)’, which, in turn, delivers a novel (11)’ instead of (11). Since (11), but
not (11)’ is Burge’s view of entitlement, Burge does not have an a priori derived view.
The alternative is, of course, to replace (5) with a biconditional in the original formulation of
the argument, which would deliver the goods. (5) would then become:
(5)’ A representation is successful if and only if it is veridical.
Which would, in turn, offer the needed support to (6) and, in turn, to (11). The issue is: why
think (5)’ holds? Recall that Burge’s support for 5’ relied on twomain claims: one value theoretic—
that truth is the chief good of representation—, and one normative—that belief that is not true is
defective qua belief.
It should be clear that the normative claimwill not offer support for the biconditional (5)’. After
all, it is compatible with false belief being defective qua belief that true belief is also defective qua
belief, in virtue of missing other crucial properties. Again, the normative claim is but a necessity
claim: good belief requires truth. As such, it is too weak to lend support to the more ambitious
(5)’’. Contra Burge, failure is not enough evidence for complete function.
How about the value theoretic claim?Unfortunately, although less straightforwardly, this claim
is also too weak to do the job. Even if beliefs are representational devices, and truth is the chief
good involved in representation, it does not follow that truth is enough for attributively good
belief—i.e., belief that is a good token of its type. And here is why: normative requirements on
types need not transmit unchanged to species: in virtue of x being a species of y, norms governing
y will transmit to x in that x will be governed by norms that are at least as demanding as the ones
governing y. Norms governing x can, however, be more stringent than norms governing y, which
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is what makes x into a particular species of y to begin with. My favourite example is that of danc-
ing and waltzing. In virtue of being a species of dancing, waltzing will be governed by norms that
are at least as demanding as those of dancing. Two-year-old children can dance. Twenty-two-year
old college graduates can learn how to waltz, if they practice enough. Take the following plau-
sible constitutive norm for dancing, N: ‘One should perform a selected sequence of movements
following a rhythmic pattern.’ This requirement should be transmitted from dancing in general to
waltzing on pain of waltzing not being a species of dancing to begin with. However, typemember-
ship merely requires that the corresponding constitutive norm governing waltzing is not weaker
than N. The norm governing the species may be stronger, in which case norm correspondence
fails. Here is the corresponding constitutive norm for waltzing: N’: ‘One should perform a triple-
time sequence of movements in close position’. Every instance of waltzing will be governed by N.’
In fact, a particular sequence of movements will not qualify as waltzing to begin with if it does
not comply with these norms.
To go back to Burge’s value-theoretic claim: recall that the thought was that truth is the chief
good involved in representation, beliefs are representational devices, from which it would seem
to follow that good beliefs are true beliefs. Just because beliefs are species of the type ‘representa-
tional device,’ though, it does not follow that the condition for ‘goodness’ is the same for beliefs
and representational devices generally. In other words, the evaluative norm for belief need not be
the same as that of representational devices in general: it can be stronger. Just like with dancing
and waltzing, it can be that representational devices in general are governed by a truth norm,
while the norm governing beliefs is stronger. If so, again, just like with the normative claim, the
value theoretic claim will only support the necessity claim involved in (5)’’.
5 KNOWLEDGE AND A PRIORI PERCEPTUAL ENTITLEMENT
In my view (Simion, 2016, 2019a, 2019b), generating knowledge is the function of our perceptual
belief formation systems,5 and belief formation processes more generally. Crucially, in what fol-
lows, I will not be engaging in deriving my particular view of entitlement on a priori grounds,
i.e. I will not take on what I dubbed ‘the Modest Derivation’ project. Rather, I would like to put
forth a knowledge-first Ambitious Derivation of a priori perceptual entitlement: i.e., if correct,
the argument below delivers the result that we are, as a matter of fact, entitled to believe based on
perception, insofar as it’s properly functioning.
Let’s start with a rough sketch of the argument: I take the constitutive function of representa-
tional belief formation systems to be generating knowledge. In virtue of it being such a system,
my perceptual belief formation system—if I have one—will follow suit. Constitutive functions, in
turn, generate constitutive norms: as such, constitutively, my perceptual system should generate
knowledge. The next step is to notice, via an analogy with games and languages, that norms con-
stituting an entity cannot be broken with maximal systematicity, while still counting as engaging
in/being the same entity: I cannot only utter ‘kakakakaka’ for the rest of my life and still count
as speaking English. If so, it seems to follow that, if I have a perceptual system, it has generated
knowledge at least once. Since systems that have generated knowledge at least once deliver epis-
temic entitlement when properly functioning, I conclude that, if I have a properly functioning
perceptual belief formation system, I am entitled to believe its deliverances.
With the rough sketch in play, let’s move on to the more detailed argument. Here it goes:6
1. Representational systems have uniquely constitutive representational functions.
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2. The representational function of a system is to successfully represent.
3. If a subject S has a perceptual belief formation system, then it is a representational system.
4. If S has a perceptual belief formation system, then its uniquely constitutive representational
function is to successfully represent (from 1–3).
5. Perceptual belief formation systems successfully represent if and only if they generate
knowledge.
6. If S has a perceptual belief formation system, its uniquely constitutive representational func-
tion is to generate knowledge (from 4 and 5).
7. Uniquely constitutive functions generate uniquely constitutive norms: when x’s constitutive
function of type T is to phi, x constitutively T-should phi.
8. If S has a perceptual belief formation system, then it is governed by a uniquely constitutive
knowledge norm (from 6 and 7).
9. If X is in maximally systematic breach of the uniquely constitutive norm for Y, then X is not
identical to Y.
10. If S has a perceptual belief formation system, it is not in maximally systematic breach of the
knowledge norm (from 8 and 9).
11. If a system M is not in maximally systematic breach of a norm that requires M to R, then M
has R-ed.
12. If S has a perceptual belief formation system, then it has (in the past or present) generated
knowledge (from 10 and 11).
13. One is prima facie entitled to one’s belief if generated by a properly functioning system that
has generated knowledge.
14. S is prima facie entitled to S’s beliefs generated by a properly functioning perceptual system
(from 12 and 13).
Note, crucially, that (14) is, de facto, a conditional claim: if we have a properly functioning per-
ceptual system, then we’re entitled to believe its outputs. Compatibly, of course, we might not
have one. Most importantly for present purposes, (14) is compatible with the idea that the sys-
tems that we take to be perceptual belief forming systems are, as a matter of fact, not perceptual
belief forming systems.
I will now run through all the premises in turn and, whenever needed, offer reason to believe
they hold.
I take (1) and (2) to not be in need of a lot of defence. It is eminently plausible that some systems
wear their constitutive functions up their sleeves, as it were, in that their dubbing is function-
driven. Plausibly, toasters have toasting functions, and the toasting function of any system is to
toast successfully. Washing machines have washing functions, and the washing function of any
system is to wash successfully.
(3) assumes a view on the nature of perception whereby its being a representational system is
an essential feature of perceptual systems qua perceptual systems. I take this not to be in need
of much defence either. That is not to say, of course, that one can know on a priori grounds that
my eyes etc. generate representations: surely, there could be a world populated by creatures that
have the exact samemechanisms that we use for representing, only they use them, say, for digest-
ing. Burge too acknowledges that it is an empirical question, to be answered by psychological
methods, whether some given system is a perceptual system (2013). But Burge and I agree that,
if a psychological system is a perceptual system, it is a priori that its fundamental and consti-
tutive function is to perceive, hence to represent. This is why the argument above establishes a
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conditional claim: if we have a perceptual system, then we’re entitled to believe its outputs. Com-
patibly, we might not have one.
(4) follows from 1, 2 and 3.
(5) will likely be the source of much disagreement. For what is worth, I think disagreement is
prima facie justified: representation seems to be about truth, not knowledge. Here is, though, a
simple argument that follows Burge’s quite closely to see why that’s wrong. Recall Burge’s plau-
sible normative claim discussed above: a belief that is not true is defective qua belief. Now, note
that a similar claim holds for knowledge: a belief that is true by luck is defective qua belief; a
belief that is not justified is defective qua belief; a belief that is Gettierized is defective qua belief.
Importantly, we know all this on a priori grounds: beliefs that fall short of knowledge in the var-
ious ways described above are criticisable (which, importantly, is not to say that the believers in
question are: to the contrary, very plausibly, justified believers are not criticisable). In turn, criti-
cisability implies evaluative norm violation: it cannot be that something X is criticisable although
there is nothing attributively defective with X. If all this is so, (5) follows. As Williamson puts it,
mere belief is botched knowledge (2000).7 Crucially, note also that knowledge is enough for non-
defective belief: there’s nothing wrong with a knowledgeable belief that falls short of certainty, for
instance.
(6) follows from (4) and (5).
I take (7) to be in no need of defence; functions in general are widely taken to generate cor-
responding norms. Constitutive functions will generate constitutive norms: since the function
in question will be sourced in the nature of the relevant item, the norms thereby generated will
follow suit.
(8) follows from (6) and (7).
To see why (9) holds, take a paradigmatic example of a constitutive norm: norms of games.
Uncontroversially, if you break too many norms of chess too flagrantly and too often, you don’t
count as playing chess anymore. To see this, note that if I just throw the chess pieces in the air all
the time, I don’t count as playing chess. When it comes to games governed by one and only one
constitutive norm, this principle translates, at a minimum, in (9): if I break the only constitutive
norm governing game G all the time, I’m not playing G (Kelp & Simion, 2020). For instance, if I’m
breaking the only constitutive norm governing the game ‘Ball in the Air,’ which stipulates that I
should throw the ball in the air, then I am not playing ‘Ball in the Air.’
(10) follows from (8) and (9). (11), I take it, is in no need of defence, and (12) follows from (10)
and (11). The perhaps hard to swallow result implied by (12) is the contrapositive (12)’: If a sys-
tem S has not generated knowledge, then it is not a perceptual belief formation system. Note also
that, in fact, the claim implied by my argument is even stronger: given that (12)’ about perception
in particular follows from its being a representational belief formation system, together with the
knowledge norm of belief, the assumption underlying the argument is the stronger (12)’’: If a sys-
temShasn’t generated knowledge, then it is not a representational belief formation system. I think
(12)’’ is correct: in failing to ever—i.e., in the past or present—generate knowledgeable beliefs, the
system in question has systematically failed to put us in cognitive contact with the world. In that,
it is not a representational belief formation system. Compatibly, of course, it might still be a repre-
sentational system simpliciter. The rabbit’s danger detection mechanism, for instance, might still
be a representational system, while it is not a representational belief formation system.
To see the plausibility of this further, recall Putnam’s famous ant case:
An ant is crawling on a patch of sand. As it crawls, it traces a line in the sand. By pure
chance the line that it traces curves and recrosses itself in such a way that it ends
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up looking like a recognizable caricature of Winston Churchill. Has the ant traced
a picture of Winston Churchill, a picture that depicts Churchill? Most people would
say, on a little reflection, that it has not. The ant, after all, has never seen Churchill, or
even a picture of Churchill, and it had no intention of depicting Churchill. It simply
traced a line [. . . ] (Putnam, 1981, p. 1).
This case lends support to content externalism: the ant does not have the concept of Churchill,
since she’s never seen or heard of Churchill, and, as a result, the line it draws in the sand does not
stand in the right relation to Churchill to count as representing Churchill.
Now, consider the following variation on this case:
Mary has been introduced to Winston Churchill and knows him well. Now, Mary
is dancing salsa at a beach party and, unbeknownst to her, by pure chance, as she
dances, she traces a line in the sand that ends up looking like a recognizable caricature
of Winston Churchill.
Has Mary drawn a picture that represents Winston Churchill? Again, most people would say
no: the line in the sand does not stand in the right relation to Churchill to count as represent-
ing Churchill. There is no difference between the ant’s line in the sand and Mary’s. Mary has the
concept of Churchill, but the right relation still fails to obtain: the causal chain, as it were, is inter-
rupted on the segment fromMary’s concept to the line in the sand: what explains the correlation
is intervening luck (Pritchard, 2005). What this suggests is that representation is incompatible,
in an important sense, with intervening luck. This, in turn, lends support to (12)’’ above: systems
exclusively generating luckily true beliefs are not representational systems, in virtue of not putting
us in cognitive contact with the world. Similarly, Mary’s dancing does not count as a representa-
tional process, no matter howmany times she luckily ends up drawing Churchill-looking lines in
the sand. Representational belief formation systems are knowledgeable belief formation systems:
they are systems that do not fail to deliver knowledge with maximal systematicity.8
Last, I take (13) to rest on a priori reflection, which reveals it to be true, in that it does not
suffer exceptions. We are, indeed, intuitively prima facie entitled to believe whatever our properly
functioning knowledge-generating processes deliver, even if they have only generated knowledge
in us once (in the past or present). The stress is on the prima facie here: defeat will make all the
difference. If Mary’s testimony has generated knowledge in me when we first met (say, about her
name being Mary), but she has been compulsively lying to me ever since, and I know it, I am
not entitled to believe her. My prima facie entitlement gets defeated. However, absent defeat, my
prima facie entitlement stands.9 For instance, ifmy perception delivered just of piece of knowledge
and then an evil scientist started generating false perceptual beliefs in me (e.g. by exposing me to
extraordinarily veridical holograms), I am entitled to believe based on perception. The reason
why this is so is because, in order for a system to generate knowledge at all, it needs to be a fairly
sophisticated epistemic machine, with an excellent track-record to begin with.10
Finally, the entitlement claim follows from (12) and (13): we are prima facie entitled to believe
based on perception; again, that is, on the assumption that we have it.
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6 CONCLUSION
Tyler Burge argued that the norm according to which perception should reliably deliver truths is
derivable on a priori grounds. I have argued that Burge’s attempted derivation encounters two
main difficulties, and that both are sourced in his truth-first picture, i.e., a picture on which
truth is the chief representational good. In turn, I have argued, if we favour a knowledge-first
picture—which, I claimed, Burge’s own arguments for truth-first support—we can deliver the
much more ambitious result that it is a priori that, insofar as we have a properly functioning per-
ceptual system, we are prima facie entitled to believe its deliverances.
ENDNOTES
1 I amdeeply indebted to PeterGraham,ChrisKelp, Jack Lyons andNicholas Silins for extensive comments on this
paper. I owe whatever understanding I might have of Burge’s views to Peter Graham (2019, 2020, forthcoming
and p.c.).
2 For and excellent overview and critical discussion of functionalist normativity, see Hazlett (2013).
3 Burge (e.g. 1979, 1982) is one of the main defenders of content externalism.
4 Normatively, not descriptively.
5 For knowledge-first views in the epistemology of perception, see e.g.Millar (2019),Miracchi (2017), Schellenberg
(2018). For criticism, see e.g. McGrath (2016).
6 Many thanks to Chris Kelp who helped spot a number of problems with several previous versions of this deriva-
tion.
7 See also Kelp (2014) for arguments that knowledge is the goal of inquiry.
8 See also Dretske (1983).
9 In line with most literature of recent years, I bracket generality problems that may and likely will arise at this
stage. See Lyons (2019) for an excellent proposal.
10 Is having generated knowledge only once really enough?What if the system in question did so once twenty years
ago, and I’ve forgotten all about it? The answer is ‘yes:’ even so. Again, the reason why this is so is because, in
order for a system to generate knowledge at all, it needs to be a fairly sophisticated epistemic machine, with
an excellent track record to begin with. To see this, all that one needs to do is fully spell out the case: what is
the process in question supposed to be? As soon as this is done, I predict, one of two things will happen: either
the process will not have the credentials to have generated knowledge in the past, or it will intuitively deliver
entitlement. Thanks to Adam Carter for pressing me on this one.
REFERENCES
Burge, T. (1979). Individualism and the mental. In P. French, T. Uehling, & H. Wettstein (Eds.),Midwest Studies in
Philosophy 4 (pp. 73–121). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Burge, T. (1982). Two thought experiments reviewed. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 23(3), 284–293. https:
//doi.org/10.1305/ndjfl/1093870087
Burge, T. (2003). Perceptual entitlement. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 67(3), 503–548. https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00307.x
Burge, T. (2010). Origins of objectivity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Burge, T. (2013). Cognition through understanding: Self-knowledge, interlocution, reasoning, reflection, philosophical
essays (Vol. 3). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Burge, T. (2020). Entitlement: The basis of empirical warrant. In P. Graham &N. J. L. L. Pedersen (Eds.), Epistemic
Entitlement. Oxford University Press.
Dretske, F. (1983). The epistemology of belief. Synthese, 55, 3–19. https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00485371
Geach, P. (1956). Good and evil. Analysis, 17, 33–42. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/17.2.33
Graham, P. (2012). Epistemic entitlement. Noûs, 46, 449–482. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00815.x
Graham, P. (2019). Why is warrant normative? Philosophical Issues: A Supplement to Noûs, 29, 110–128. https://doi.
org/10.1111/phis.12142
SIMION 323
Graham, P. (2020). Why should warrant persist in demon worlds? In P. Graham & N. Pedersen (Eds.), Epistemic
Entitlement (pp. 179–202). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198713524.003.0005
Graham, P. (Forthcoming). What is epistemic entitlement? In C. Kelp & J. Greco (Eds.), Virtue theoretic epistemol-
ogy. Cambridge University Press.
Hazlett, A. (2013). A luxury of the understanding: On the value of true belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kelp, C. (2014). Two for the knowledge goal of inquiry. American Philosophical Quarterly, 51(3), 227–232.
Kelp, C., & Simion, M. (2020). The C account of assertion: A negative result. Synthese, 197, 125–137. https://doi.org/
10.1007/s11229-018-1760-5
Lyons, J. C. (2019). Algorithm and parameters: Solving the generality problem for reliabilism. Philosophical Review,
128(4), 463–509. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-7697876
McGrath, M. (2016). Schellenberg on the epistemic force of experience. Philosophical Studies, 173(4), 897–905.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0529-7
Millar, A. (2019). Knowing by perceiving. Oxford University Press.
Millikan, R. (1984). Language, thought, and other biological categories. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Miracchi, L. (2017). Perception first. Journal of Philosophy, 114(12), 629–677. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil20171141244
Pritchard, D. (2005). Epistemic luck. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Putnam, H. (1981). Reason, truth and history. Cambridge University Press.
Schellenberg, S. (2018). The unity of perception: Content, consciousness, evidence. Oxford University Press.
Simion, M. (2016). Perception, history and benefit. Episteme, 13(1), 61–76. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2015.56
Simion, M. (2019a). Knowledge-first functionalism. Philosophical Issues: A supplement to Nous, 29, 254–267.
https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12152
Simion, M. (2019b). Epistemic norms and epistemic functions. Manuscript.
Simion, M., Kelp, C., & Ghijsen, H. (2016). Norms of belief. Philosophical Issues, 26(1), 375–392. https://doi.org/10.
1111/phis.12077
Williamson, T. (2000). Knowledge and its limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
How to cite this article: Simion M. A priori perceptual entitlement, knowledge-first.
Philosophical Issues. 2020;30:311–323. https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12187
